MORAL ORIGINS AND THE NUB OF ETHICS
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BROTHERSTON

moral phil-

to the present writer that the

has often appeared
ITosophers
have dealt too
hiuiian

Of

life.

cavalierly with the materials of early

course none are so well awarei as they that the

diflcrence between tribal or national standards

They would

not, as less well-informed

men

a relative matter.

is

might, think of basin^^

charc^e that another people lacked moral
Yet the suspicion may be justified that the extreme
difference between our own ways and the ways of uncivilized men
is iaraielv the basis of the doctrine that moral consciousness is absent

upon

this difference the

consciousness.

or merelv "in prerm"

as

among them. This error, if it exists,
The method presents the nub

is

well-conceived method.

in a
it

hidden

of ethics

appears "to the enlightened moral consciousness", and takes
study of moral origins. The presence or

this as a criterion in the

absence of moral consciousness or the degree of

its

bv the presence or absence or the degree of force

force

is

measured

in early life of this

"nub of ethics.^
It is

to this

and

notorious that the views of moralists differ widely.

nub of

ethics there

sociologists,

is

general agreement.

As

But as

psychologists

moral philosophers may have different ways of
But all agree that volun-

accounting for volition and responsibility.
tariness

is

what gives conduct

of course individual volition

.

its

ethical equality.

Hence courses

And

volition

individuals are responsible are the subject-matter of ethics.

even the casual reader of the customs and beliefs of early

pp.

But

men

^Westermarck, TJic Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. Vol. I,
Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, Vol
p. 524 f.
135 f, 137, note. McDougal, Society Psychology, p. 238 f.

202; Chaps VIII-X, esp.

is

of action for which

re-

p.

II,
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members

any notion of individnal responsibility played a very
is prepared to hear that moral con-

that

small part among- them and he
sciousness

is

absent or vaguely

g-erm".

'in

But if he be one who has yielded to the fascination of strange
customs and has read farther, he will remember cases of passionate loyalty among savage peoples of the Greek Menoikeus immolating himself to save his city ;- of Oedipus wishin^g to be exiled to
remove the "imcleanness" from Thebes or of an Indian brave who
accepts a forlorn hope to save a contingent of his tribe. One reads
the Libation Bearers of Aeschylus and finds himself at once in the
atmosphere of Central Africa or Polynesia and at the same time in
an intense life of moral praise and blame. One wonders whether
Aeschylus, immersed a? he was in the Chthonic religion of Greek
;

;

peasants, as nearly primitive as
this intense

all

is

Central Africa today, has read

moral feeling into the tradition, and has not truly

—

no doubt omitting many external things that
were confused in it the inwardness of early life. Greek tradition
descends from the period of barbarism. Yet the dramatic power
interpreted for us

—

of Euripides

is

achieved while presenting these traditions just as

they are, bringing out their
ate

good and

When

evil,

human

relations in full force of passion-

passionate praise and blame.

is told by the moralists that custom, which is the
man, was wholly external as though it were obeyed
without anv force of inward approval, merely from superstitious and
wholly unfounded fear, one feels that something has been overlooked that there is something- at fault in the usual method of study-

one

ethics of early

;

;

ing moral origins.

But on the contrary,

it

may be

the case that the

Greek dramatists are true interpreters of the traditions of their
ancestors.

made bv

Doul:)tless they

made

analyses of

human

early,

situations not

were not made by the masses of their
powerful handling of the materials of

their fathers, as they

contemporaries.

But

their

tradition merely served to bring out the force present in those tra-

and

ditions

The

in the

experience of their creators.

thesis of this

have been

in this

paper

is

that the materials of early

human

life

regard wholly misread, because a too radical in-

dividualism has mislead moral philosophers as to the nub of ethics.
It will
it

vvill

begin with a study of primitive man's world-view in which
make appear the genuine moral consciousness in-

attempt to

2Cox, 'flic Afyfholnt/y
Phoenician J'irgins, 990 ff.

of

the

Aryan Nations,

p.

415.

Euripides,

The

iSIORAI.

\-oh'ed in social or
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group responsibility

individual responsibility did not at

part

it

.\

Next

later played.

l)y

U

OF

T.

/

show why

to

:

1-:TII1CS

0/

the notion of

enter; and to suggest the

first

tracing the development of the concept

we

of moral evil in Greek thought,

make

will

clear the inextricable

group

relation of individual responsibility to social or

res])onsibility.

Finallv bv a very brief outline of the development of the concept

of the good in

experience, traced from the primiti\e world-

Hebrew

we

view to the teachings of Jesus,

will

make

how

a]^])ear

the re-

ligious motive, really the mnti\e of social responsibility, maintained
itself as the
it

as

we

obscure and at

an implication, at first
maintain that indi\idual responsibility
:

that while

it

with

ethics, carrying individual res|)onsibilit\'

is

inevitabl\'

involved

can never be clearly and distinctly

in

is

not the nub of

social

resjionsibilty,

separated from

while, as in the ])rimiti\e world-view,

it

TTence

last fully clear.

will

ethics
it

ground of

lies

within

confused wa\-, groui^ responsibility manifests

in

wholly

a

genuine and

a

still

even

P.ut

it.
it

full-powered moral consciousness.
Since Codrington ]:)resentcd the ^^lelanesian conception of uiaiia
in 1891,

there has issued

among

scholars a tendency to believe in the

existence of a preanimistic world-view.

The following

tation of this primitive JJ'cltaiiscIiainnK/

is ofl:'ered

synthesises the entire field of

facts.

It

what seemed most

man was

ticular thing

real to earlv

— human

body or natural

is

as that

usuall\-

in.terpre-

which best
that

suiJ]DOsed

the distinct and solid par-

oliject.

This bod\' or object,

through experience of dreams or visions, had come to be "doubled"
bv an anima or soul. But this view is a preconception on the part

modern students rather than a result of the study of the facts.
Such a study shows rather that the thing most real to early man is
something he cannot see. It is a reality inward to the w^orld in genIndeed it is
eral as a man's psvchical nature is inward to his body.
But however universal,
universal in primitive man's little world.
this reality has not been conceived by the abstracting intelligence.
It is the immediate issue of his own psychical organization and it
of

has the vivid and persistent reality of spontaneous impulse.

would never occur

to early

man

to

doubt

its

presence

It

in the ritual

observances of his people, the awful ]^ower of natural storms, or the

dread passion of social upheavals.

We

ha\e here perhaps a fact

of foundational significance in the study of

common

sense view of realitv

view of

later ages

when

h,as

social

human

not always been the

nature.

common

atomism has prevailed.

It

The
sense

did not
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always fasten upon the unit of sense perception. It has always been
ingenuous enough, but man's first sense of reality followed the lines
of inner rather than of outer perception and it issued in the conception of a vital, psychic, dynamic reality felt with varying potency
;

through the flow of his

nor

It

life.

found

its

"substance" not in solidity,

individual distinctness, but in so tenuous a matter that

in

could flow through

all solidities like ions.

It is

the solidary,

and natural environment, holding

reality of kin, clan, tribe,

all

it

inwaru
things

The labored conception
human experience, which issued in mod-

together in the real world of his experience.
of a unity, presupposed in

ern philosojDhy to correct the subjectivity of Berkeleyan idealism,

was

native,

though

in absolute naivete, in the

world-view of primi-

tive man."^

immediate reference of man's experience to the univerarrangement and management of his world out
of man's hand. ]\[an"s ability to afl:ect his own world and life was
conceived to lie in his ability to operate this power through the
PfUt this

sal did not take the

discovery of systems of interconnections which

manipulation of these.

it

followed and a

This brings us at once into the realm of

re-

and "magic" ritual. It was customary thirty years ago to
Apparently the "power" that
explain magic as primitive science.
operated in magic was taken to be the force of causal relationship
or of logical implication. This force was thought to have been felt
in a wholly vague way by the primitive mind and to have been conligious

fused therefore with the more obvious psychological associations of
similarity

and continuity.

But

it

becomes evident upon study of the

sources that man's power to adapt himself to physical forces and

by observation of their causes and implications
plaved no dominant part. It was not that early man was deficient in
this power.
Its prosaic progress was retarded, and greatly retarded,
physical

as

was

moral

things

also his sense of individual responsibility, not
inca]:)acity,

by

logical or

but by his systematic and ])ersistent attemj)ts to

more profound and elemental force. This force was
It was the total force of his psychical
organization, the impulsive objectification of his own nature. It was
still without analysis and hence it was conceived as being both matter
and force unbounded. It flashed in with concentrated power upon
operate

vliis

primitive man's reality sense.

"For another view, see Hopkins, History of Rrlic/ioii, p 18. But Flopkins
takes the view-point that the savage thinks "concretely". He has not snt^ciently
felt the force of the shape-shifting nature of the savage world, whose constant realities are general solidarities.
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less strikingly pre-

sent itself to a wholly inexperienced intelligence.

It

presents strong

evidence, as against the usnal theor}- of the instincts, of an innate

organization of man's total psychical equipment, which shows

itself,

amidst the confusion of objective events, in a want, of all wants
the most specifically human, and one just as persistent and definite
as

hunger or sex,

— the

prophetic restlessness, the ethical penchant

for social integration, the philosophical desire for universal integra-

want for God.

tion, for unity, the religious

human

primitive
hension.
It itself
cult.

It

It v\'as

was

life

'"the

Presence"

This deepest force

in

appre-

in earliest religious

nearer than breathing and closer tlian hands or feet.

was immediately known.
was a wind blowing where

consequences alone were oc-

Its

listed.

it

It

focusserl like storm

and common men could not tell
whence it came or whither it went. So was e^xry one born of this
Rut such a man
spirit and every place where it focusscd its power.
became potent with esoteric knowledge and power to bless or ban.
Similar were sacred spots where it was concentrated and localized.
It was thus that the later animism and theism were derived from this
forced at ditlercnt times

The

earlier religion.

and

places,

plenitude of this theoplasm, concentrated in

sacred places, constitutes the vague aniconic deities of pre-theistic
times,

and that

in

semi-divine heroes.

the

persons,

It

likely

is

through an interplay of these two that personal gods are conceived.

Hence

is

it

not the case that magic

was an

early science.

was

It

not the case that the loose associational connections were confused

with the more binding relations whose tracing constitutes science.
The world-view of early man is not to be apprehended by any such
comparison with the modern mind. It is to be apprehended only in
the apprehension of their sense of a ubiquitous reality, holding
in

unity, ready to strike across

Indeed for primitive

have any connection

was

of interest,
real identity

contiguity
in

may
all

—

relation

lines

run.

sorts of

to

however

all

insignificant.

discover anv relation whatever.

—

to

thought or things become a distinct matter

to discover a natural

is sufificient

ent in

in

to

under difference.

difference,

reality

man

any

avenue of

this potency, this

x\ny sort of similarity, anv sort of

—

become an evidence of reality, of identity
which potent operations of the unseen

u]:ion

Thus while

this

is

ubiquitous, universal,

changing qualities and degrees,

tern of utmost intricacy, as

it

—a

it

is

pres-

changing pat-

follows the lines of these connections

"
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which intrench upon each

oth.er

because vaguely observed and car-

ried be_\ond their proper scope.

Now

the significant matter in primitive man's world-view

is

just

At every turn of the data one is struck
of solidarit\-.
There is evidence on every

this continuity of the real.

with early man's feeling

side of a sense of real connections binding apparently distinct things

and events.

The contagion

of "uncleanness" and of

closelv connected, the inner Ijond of kinship acquired

partaking of the blood of the kin, or even of
connections,

— these

undercurrents of

reality

l)y

common
all

sacredness,

by

birth or

food, these

referring

to

the

same underlying theoplasm, dominate the life of early man. The}'
are the inner power for which custom merely fixes the lines of operation.

Jevons pointed out long ago that the contagion of taboo is not
is an a priori jjrinciple."'
E(|ually so

conceived through an error but

bond of kinship and the force of curses and blessings. They
forms of the same thing. They are the sanctions of custom
priori aspect.
and the source of its authority and they give it its
This obsession of solidarity, which found real connections in
every chance relation, militated against any proper conce]:)tion of the
It is exceedingly importrelations of individuals and particulars.
is

the

are

all

(7

ant to notice this ob\-erse side

of

early

The

man's world-view.

a world of lesser reality capable of all kinds
Its changes proceed upon connections inwardly
of metamorphoses.
Hence all sorts of real relationships and all sorts of merging
felt.

world of particulars

is

A man

and a crow may ]:)erfectly well be of the same
and the hail may perfectly well be in the same
Particular things and persons may
class as the crow and the man."
from old woman to beautiful maiden, or to
shape-shift indefinitely
The identity of such forms is an inward
serpent, or to werewolf.
matter discovered on traditional lines. The individual is merged in
There is a continuity in which each
his kin and in his environment.
are possible.

kin, anrl

(he rain

—

individual and each particular has significance according as he or
is

tl'ie

it

locus of a greater or lesser concentration of the continuous

Always submerging the individual and the
all that is real in any person or thing is
a superrealm from which the tril)al custom gets its whole force and
the lines of whose operation it marks. It is a cosmic power. To call it
a transhuman reality were to make a distinction between humanity
reality of the universe.

particular and constitutiiig

to the History of RcViii'wu. p. 88.
Diirkhcim. Tlic Eh-mcutary Forms of Rclif/inus Life,

Introduction
""'See

p.

141

ff.
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and the workl which early man ne\er made. It is a hvi^erreahp,
including- all particulars and constitutin.g a cosmic unity solidary with
A fluidity of
the central current of human impulse and emotion.
perception following lines of a continuity not conceived intellectually

but arrived at upon the basis of impulse and emotion characterized

The

the world-view of early man.
ticular

is

universal

is

The

the real.

par-

appearance.

\\'e arc

now

position to understand primitive man's con-

a

in

They had one source together in the
same realitv and the same cosmic power. The difference between
them belongs to the realm of relations among individual and particular persons and things.
The theoplasm focusses in advantageous
and in disadvantageous combinations of particular things. It may
ception of good and

evil.

it

may

is

beyond good and

evil,

finds to take, connections wdiich

man

follow lines of beneficence to the kin, or
aster.

TUit this real

which

lie in

Presence

the connections

may

it

is

one.

It

break out in dis-

Saccr means both sacred and polluted, and
from which derive both ayo? ]~)ollution and dyros holy.
The same ])Ower operates for blessing- or for cursing, for good or for
evil according to outer forms that may be manipulated bv enemy or
himself

ay

is

determine.

the root

friend.

From

the beginning

men

believed that

if

the group strictly fol-

lowed the customs, particularly observing the

would operate

the ma^gic of enemies, reality
not.

any

evil

might

good or toward
with

men — with

fall.

evil
all

The

lines

men open

rites

and

offsetting

in all beneficence.

are the lines the hidden force takes.

men

with the directors of the

in

Because the Tao of

tate the

Tao

It

lies

following the customs

—but

especially

open good or

ways

for sacred

ritual, to

power.

If

or leave open toward

man

in

evil

China does not implicitly imi-

of heaven, the forces of the universe operate for evil

The

Rita in India is at once the ritual and the order
some breach in the former that brings disturbance
in the latter.
In Greek life the Real Presense has early been divided up into a pantheon of distinctly personal gods and thus
particularity and evil wdth it had been carried back into the realm
of the real. The early thinkers were baffled by this escapeless fusion
of good and evil among the gods. The philosophers repudiated the
gods altogther, excluded impulse and emotion in which the gods
had their origin, and made the cjuest for reality a noetic pursuit.
The dramatists were unwilling to go so far. It remained a baffling
to

mankind.

of nature and

it is
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problem to them.

was perhaps with

It

of Euripides w^as intended to deal

It

Bacchae

this prol)lem that the

presents the real presence of

and noble social passion
and the frenzy of social chaos.
but according to the current of man's life.

deity as, on the one hand, poetic inspiration

mad

and, on the other, as

Both issue from

Upon

the action of Pentheus, the locus of social authority, depends

which

by Cadman, and

from one

If so

adjured,

men

—by

the

"All

:

priest,

may

yet

good and
direction and qual-

reflect the idea that

which takes different

reality

according to the trend

trol.

is

by the God, himself

finally

Euripides seems here to

be well".
evil issue

Repeatedly he

prcAail.

shall

Teriesius,

ity

deity,

intoxication

give the social relations they con-

he has returned with clear concepts to what

human traditions.
human situation had its

essentially

is

the attitude of the earliest

The
against

first

traceable

evil,

its

criterion for judging

passion for good and

them and

its

methods for

particular and individual relations a normal moral consciousness

working.

As we have

suggested,

it

es-

In total confusion of

caping the one and achieving the other.

was very force

was

of moral con-

sciousness Avhich prevented an earlier analysis of relations betw'een

both the moral and the natural realms.
Let us see what was the extent of this confusion in the moral
sphere. In that "uncleanness" wliich arises out of sinster focussings,

l^articulars in

sinister courses of the
evil

common

rclitv

are present without distinction.

elements.

First, natural evils

which

seen operations of natural laws.

without intent, which

if

nil

We
fall

the different aspects of

can separate

its

upon men out

Second, evils which

men

several

of unfor-

enact but

intended would be genuine moral evil such

as the "sin" of Oedipus.

Tliird, there are evils

ageiit could not avoid but which

common

which the immediate

sense persists in calling

wrought under passion that came upon the agent
out of larger circles of evil in which he was involved. Fourth, the
moral evil of the Aristotelian what the individual could have avoided. These distinct matters are mingled together in utmost confusion.
Guilt and punishment, accident and design, sin and misfortune lie
undislinguished in a common ground of evil, to which primitive
man referred the whole force of his moral consciousness. Profound moral loathing attached to any of its focussings. to the inmoral

evil- -deeds

—

—

ner thouqht or to the outer object or act alike.
ing their purificatory
inner thought

is

rites,

Indians perform-

must refrain from thoughts of strife. The
in precisely the same way as the outer

"unclean"
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There is no lack of inwardnesp. but a failure to distino-uish
inward and outward. Again the individual's voluntary misdeed is
"unclean" iust as the passionate or accidental evil in which he is
There is no absence nor weakness of moral consciousinvolved.
deed.

ness

:

but rather the solidarity of the whole

field

of evil as of

good

is

so powerfully felt that moral fcelino-s rightly attached only to certain aspects of evil are indistinguishably attached to
AA'ith

til

is

mind

in

it

all.

not difficult to understand

is

why

scholars

have thought that auK^ng earlv men there has been no conception of
moral e\'il at all. or one onlv "implicit" ov "in germ", and that custom which prescribes the individual's conduct was a matter of merely
external rules sanctioned by superstitious fears.
individual nlnvs so slight a

in

i~iart'

Tt

is

because the

the world-view of early men,

whereas modern ethical thought is centered in the individual. The
enlightened moral consciousness lays all emphasis upon the imThe savage
mediate aacnt and thereby does him vast injustice.
upon
which
locus
a generaldiscovering
the
mind was intent only on
point
the
This is
ized moral evil had centered its baneful force.
it

is

the locus of a superparticular evil they are intent upon, rather

tha.n the

agent of a ])articidar deed.

cept in case he

is

power

The agent

is

passed over ex-

I'pon that locus the

also the locus.

guilt,

the sin,

any connection inTt
fecting a whole citv and causing flood and earthquake and war.
can even pass its contaf^'ifn ^'" <'^'' -'^-i<ions (^f time, making days
imclean. Tt is this which renders resentment at real agents strangely
Resentment of a violent color fastens rather
slight in savage life.

has fallen with

on particular

fluid

its

loci

A man

of evil.

loathed, or a stone, or a beast.

moral

thai

e\'il

is

that can flow on

to

whom

Tt is

an accident occurs

may

be

not the agent but the locus of

important to early man.

Here is the key to the imderstanding of primitive ethics. Early
man was concerned with the control of evil conceived as a social and
indeed as a cosmic unity and
such.

The

social

is

and cosmic

not concerned with the individual as

ceiving the true relation of the individual to
evil is

evil.

a restoration of balance in the hyperrealm,

sacredness to flow again in positive channels.

must be

Whether

localized.

centre

of

the locus of the loathed evil

be removed.
as agent

The

is

Tt is significant that

the magician

who

him from per-

falling of evil prevent

The

control of

making negative

The

sinister focus

danger must be dealt with.
be another or oneself it must

the agent of evil

first

reprobated

for private ends can disturb the balance
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of
is

hvperrealni and centre

tlie

the

And

first

the

agent of moral

man

of social praise

strong moral

fusion of

To
earl\-

life

forces for ill on man or group. He
Every other sinner is merely a locus.

the

is

The

theoplasm for social good.

A

its

evil.

man who

early priest

can manipulate the

is

usually also chief.

seen here in progress but in utmost con-

is

elements.

its

he sure the feeling of the significance of agency enters very

under the motive of

justice to the individual, while yet the all-

imjiortant control of superindividual evil in society

Agencv often seems
or person

kept secure.

is

be taken as a sign that the individual thing

to

and of

trulv the locus of a superindividual evil

is

how

profound an evil. Tn English law, for instance, a cart or other object was "deodand", given to God, if it fell on a man when it was
The
said "nioverc ad iiiorfcin", but not if the man fell upon it."

Hebrew law
is

established cities of refuge for the accidental slayer.

not that he

is

not a locus of the

reach his refuge.
the high priest,
central.

A

He must

when

evil,

remain there, an exile
is

x\nd this process

are very largely

slightly

mere

loci

evils,

are sacrificed to justice,

still

of vast social evils and
these

Yet today

to

be apj^eased.

if

he be a minor,

nized to be the locus of sui:)erindividual
is

in

conceived by the "legal mind" as

the proved agent of a crime, especiallv

and

of the

means com-

an occult force to be balanced or deity

particular deeds,

death of

vie\A'

having been born into involvement

agents,

onl\-

It

he

longer danger-

not by any

is

if

here in process of

from the primitive

excluding ad\entitious elements

Men who

until the

new regime renders him no

a

sense of justice to the individual

social control of evil.
plete.

nor that he ceases to be

evil, as

is

recog-

well as the agent of

sentenced to social training rather than to a

"halancing retrilnition.

Tn a second part of this paper, the inextricable relation of indi-

vidual resi>onsibility to social or group responsibility will be clearly

by tracing the development of the concept of moral evil
Greek thought. Then by tracing, in Hebrew history, the development of the o]:)])osite conception that of the good it will be made
to ai)])ear how, from the ])rimitive world-view to Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God, the religious motive
reallv the motive
of social responsibility maintained itself as the ground of ethics,
ilkT^trated

in

—
—

—

—

carrying individual responsibility with
ol)scurely, at last quite clearly.

"Westcrmarck. Op.

Cit..

Vol.

I,

p,

264.

it

as an implication, at first

